More of their doing what's called paper terrorism, issuing a series of phony writs, court orders, and suits while claiming to be a tribe. Some of their claims are pretty bizarre. The "band" was founded at an Arby's, and I think this might be the first time a court cited definitions of "magickal thinking."
http://www.narf.org/nill/bulletins/dct/unreported/wampanoag.htmlCite as: 2006 WL 1073561 (D.Utah))
Briefs and Other Related Documents
United States District Court,D. Utah, Central Division.
Curtis RICHMOND, Plaintiff,
v.
WAMPANOAG TRIBAL COURT CASES: Case: 2005-301-EFS; Case 2005-302-BOA; Case 2005-300-CB, Defendants.
No. 2:06-CV-15BSJ.
April 21, 2006.
Curtis Richmond, Solana Beach, CA, pro se.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
JENKINS, Senior J.
(Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a))
*1 The above-captioned proceeding is now before the court on Curtis Richmond's motion to amend his pleadings following this court's dismissal of his original petition for a writ of mandamus. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a).
Procedural History
Plaintiff Curtis Richmond commenced the above-captioned action by filing a document captioned as a “Writ of Mandamus Confirming Pembina Nation Little Shell Calif. Federal Tribal Circuit Court Ordered Writ of Mandamus so Law Enforcement Must Obey Lawful Tribal Court Orders Supported by U.S. Supreme Court Rulings,??? on January 5, 2006 (dkt. no. 1). But Richmond did not name any federal government officer or other person, officer, corporation, or inferior court as a respondent to his petition and against whom relief in the nature of mandamus would lie.
Because this court was not satisfied that Richmond had properly invoked the subject matter jurisdiction of this court in commencing this action without naming a respondent, it dismissed his petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.
). (See Order of Dismissal, filed February 23, 2006 (dkt. no. 6).)
On March 6, 2006, Richmond filed an amended petition for a writ of mandamus (dkt. no. 7). The court struck that pleading because of Richmond's failure to obtain leave of court to amend his pleadings. (See Order, filed March 7, 2006 (dkt. no. 9).)
On March 14, 2006, Richmond filed a “Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Writ of Mandamus to Conform with Subject Matter Jurisdiction Issues Covered in Court Order to Dismiss Without Prejudice??? (dkt. no. 11) (“Mot. To Amend???), followed by an “Addendum or Supplement to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend,??? & etc., filed March 30, 2006 (dkt. no. 12) (“Addendum???). Richmond has submitted additional papers as well.
Richmond's proposed amended writ petition names several federal officers as respondents: the Attorney General of the United States, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of California, United States Marshal David McAllister, and “F.B.I. Agent Mario Ruiz.
It appears to seek relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus compelling the respondents to “Obey their Oath of Office to Support and Defend the U.S. Constitution,??? including “Obeying Judge Henry Lee Norman Anderson's Writ of Mandamus.
(Mot. to Amend at 3.) In Richmond's view, “This Court has a Duty and Obligation to Confirm Judge Anderson's Lawful and Enforceable Writ of Mandamus.
(Id. at 3-4.)
The referenced “Writ of Mandamus??? appears to be captioned in the “Pembina Nation Little Shell California Federal Tribal Circuit Court??? and purports to address “three major legal issues,??? including “Sovereignty of Indian Tribes??? and whether “Non Indians must obey Indian Court Orders,??? whether “All Lawful Judges must have Judicial Oaths on File,??? and “Malfeasance of a Judicial Oath occurs if a Judge does not Obey his Judicial Oath.
(“Writ of Mandamus,??? dated December 20, 2005, a copy of which in annexed to Mot. to Amend.) It appears to confirm that “judgments of ‘courts of common justice’ are valid, real, and enforceable,??? apparently referring to orders of the “Supreme Court Wampanoag Tribe of Grayhead Wolf Band??? directed to two state superior court and federal district judges in California concerning pending litigation involving Richmond. Those orders purport to dismiss the cases pending against Richmond in the California state and federal courts (and Third District Court in the State of Utah) for lack of jurisdiction, ostensibly on the theory that “[t]he Supreme Court of Wampanoag Tribe of Greyhead Wolf Band has Jurisdiction over all Tribal Members???-including Richmond as an “adopted??? member-and that those courts have shown “Bias towards the Plaintiff??? and have violated “the Plaintiff's Constitutional Right of Due Process.
footnote.reference
Richmond's Theory of the Case
*2 To date, Richmond has submitted at least a dozen papers in this case, proffering numerous quotations extracted from judicial opinions-often Nineteenth-Century Supreme Court cases published in the earlier volumes of the United States Reports-as well as law dictionaries, encyclopedias, and federal and state code provisions. The quotations speak to various aspects of Indian tribal status, the jurisdiction of state and federal courts, and the rule of law. Richmond weaves the selected quotations into a rambling and circuitous dissertation, rich in sweeping abstractions phrased in oft-capitalized and abstruse legalistic prose.
As best the court can glean from the papers now in the file, Richmond contends that federal law principles of Indian tribal sovereignty footnote.reference empower the “Supreme Court of Wampanoag Tribe of Greyhead Wolf Band??? to enter orders preempting the exercise of civil jurisdiction by state and federal courts over his person and property in cases already commenced in those courts by Citibank, Bank of America, and others, and that it may do so in favor of compulsory adjudication of those parties' claims in the tribal forum. The “Supreme Court of Wampanoag Tribe of Greyhead Wolf Band??? having issued such orders, and the “Pembina Nation Little Shell California Federal Tribal Circuit Court??? having issued a December 20, 2005 writ confirming that the former court's orders are “valid, real, and enforceable,??? Richmond further contends that the named federal officers are duty-bound to “enforce??? those orders, including “bench warrants??? and awards of sanctions of $1,000 per day as against each of the defendants named in the tribal proceedings because “[t]he defendants must know that Tribal members have absolute sovereign authority???-and, it seems, absolute immunity from the civil jurisdiction of state and federal courts. Failing this, the respondents would “stand convicted of treason for failure to honor and enforce the spirit and letter of law.
footnote.reference
Richmond further asserts that this court may-indeed, must-grant relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus requiring the Attorney General of the United States, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of California, and various federal law enforcement officers to do the bidding of the “Supreme Court of Wampanoag Tribe of Greyhead Wolf Band??? and carry that tribunal's orders into full force and effect, as well as vacating any orders or judgments entered by the state and federal courts in the subject proceedings since the tribal orders were issued.
The Enforcement of Orders of Indian Tribal Courts
Richmond's proposed pleading seeks an order of this court decreeing the enforcement of orders issued by the “Supreme Court of Wampanoag Tribe of Greyhead Wolf Band,??? and in doing so, he raises the threshold question whether that tribunal possessed the requisite subject matter and personal jurisdiction to make those orders....
[Material on what determines if a tribe is legit deleted.]
We are concerned here with Richmond's plea that this court order the summary enforcement by federal officers of what purport to be Indian tribal court orders demanding the dismissal of civil actions in the state and federal courts involving Mr. Richmond.
Federal Recognition & Richmond's Claims in This Case
In this case, Richmond submits that the “Wampanoag Tribe of Greyhead Wolf Band??? and “Pembina Nation Little Shell Band??? are federally recognized Indian tribes. But at least as of its November 25, 2005 publication, neither group appears by name on the Interior Department's list of federally recognized Indian tribes. See 70 Fed.Reg. at 71193-71198.
Richmond's papers point to other indicia of federal recognition, including the Treaty with the Chippewa, Red Lake and Pembina Bands, dated October 2, 1863, 13 Stat. 667, the Presidential Message transmitting that treaty to the Senate for ratification, compiled excerpts from historical congressional and executive documents,footnote.reference the Montana Supreme Court's opinion in Koke v. Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians of Montana, Inc., 2003 MT 121, 315 Mont. 510, 68 P.3d 814, a page printed from a “Pembina Nation Little Shell Band??? Web site, footnote.reference and assorted correspondence.
The Koke case involved a group known as the Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians of Montana, Inc., incorporated under the laws of the State of Montana and actively seeking federal recognition through the acknowledgment procedure established by Congress and the Department of the Interior. See U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Proposed Finding for Federal Acknowledgment of the Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians of Montana, 65 Fed.Reg. 45394 (July 21, 2000). Koke makes no reference to the “Pembina Nation Little Shell Band,??? a group which appears to be centered in North Dakota footnote.reference and claims a territory of 62,000,000 acres-including about three-fourths of the State of North Dakota.
*8 In Delorme v. United States, 354 F.3d 810 (8th Cir.2004), the Eighth Circuit outlined the distinction between the two groups:
At least two groups currently claim to be Little Shell Bands descended from the Pembina led by Chief Little Shell in the late nineteenth century. The Little Shell Band of Chippewa Indians of North Dakota (also known as the Little Shell Pembina Band of North America) is a federally unrecognized band located in North Dakota. It is seeking federal recognition through the BIA, and it is on behalf of this band that Ronald Delorme has filed his action. It is not clear, however, how this group relates to the Little Shell Bands involved in the 1978 Indian Claims Commission litigation. The Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians of Montana, located in Great Falls, Montana, descends from a part of the Pembina Band led by Chief Little Shell which moved to that area at the end of the nineteenth century. The Montana Tribe appears to be the successor in interest to the Little Shell Band of Chippewa Indians represented by Joseph H. Dussome in the 1970s Indian Claims Commission litigation, and its members appear to have participated as individuals in the earlier litigation as well. Presently the Band is seeking federal recognition through the BIA, and it is not involved in the case before the court.
354 F.3d at 814 n. 6.
Citing to Koke and Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266, 36 Ct.Cl. 577, 21 S.Ct. 358, 45 L.Ed. 521 (1901), Richmond asserts that the “Wampanoag Tribe of Greyhead Wolf Band??? is “Common Law Organized,??? and that “the Tribe's National Sovereignty ... is Recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court Rulings.
footnote.reference But he neither cites to nor furnishes copies of any treaties, statutes, court decisions, administrative rulings or other pertinent materials reflecting any recognition of a group known as the “Wampanoag Tribe of Greyhead Wolf Band??? by Congress, the Executive Branch or the federal or state courts. Instead, he submits an April 8, 2002 letter addressed to “Chief Dale Stevens??? of the “Wampanoag Tribe of Greyhead Wolf Band??? at an address in Vernal, Utah, from someone identified as “Chief Counsel??? of the “Ministry of Justice??? of the “NATO Indian Nation,??? having an address in Provo, Utah. The letter purports to “recognize[ ] the Wampanoag Nation, Tribe of Greyhead, Wolf Band??? and establish “government-to-government??? relations with the Wampanoag.
(Unauthenticated copy of letter annexed to Mot. to Amend.)
Richmond's written submissions furnish but a very slender reed upon which to rest his sweeping assertions as to the existence, sovereignty and jurisdiction of either the “Wampanoag Tribe of Greyhead Wolf Band??? or “Pembina Nation Little Shell Band,??? or for that matter, his claims of “diplomatic immunity??? from suit in state and federal courts in California and Utah. A litigant may assert that, like the appellant in Davis v. Packard, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 312, 8 L.Ed. 957 (1834), he, too, stands before the court as “consul-general of the King of Saxony and [is] therefore exempt from suit in the state court,??? but the mere assertion, by itself, does not establish the fact....
In related proceedings in this District, the court concluded that the “Wampanoag Tribe of Greyhead Wolf Band??? was actually “formed at an Arby's Restaurant in Provo, Utah on April 18, 2003,footnote.reference and is not in fact a federally recognized Indian tribe-a fact apparently not in genuine dispute in that proceeding.
In contrast, the James case, discussed above, involved “the Gay Head Wampanoags who have inhabited the area [of Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts] since 1642. They have been commonly known as American Indians from historical times until the present.
824 F.2d at 1133. So there is a federally recognized tribe of Wampanoag Indians, namely the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) of Massachusetts. 70 Fed.Reg. at 71197.
Richmond has neither averred any facts nor proffered any legal or historical material of genuine substance that would establish federal recognition of the “Wampanoag Tribe of Greyhead Wolf Band??? as an Indian tribe, or that would establish that the “Pembina Nation Little Shell Band??? and the Pembina Band of Chippewa Indians that was a named party to the October 2, 1863 Treaty are one and the same.
Nor does Richmond cite to any pertinent legal authority that may be read to authorize-or obligate-the named respondents or this court to enforce orders issued by the purported “tribal court??? of a group not recognized as an Indian tribe by the United States.
Richmond's Proposed Amended Pleading & Rule 15 “Futility???
But in this case, this court need not decide the merits of the question whether either the “Wampanoag Tribe of Greyhead Wolf Band??? or “Pembina Nation Little Shell Band??? are bona fide Native American tribes, bands or “distinctly Indian communities??? within the meaning of the applicable federal law. This court need not revisit the question whether the “Wampanoag Nation, Greyhead Wolf Band??? was created at an Arby's in Provo in 2003; nor must it examine whether the “Pembina Nation Little Shell Band??? is in fact the “active anti-government extremist group??? and “part of the anti-government ‘sovereign citizen’ movement??? that some have described it as being.footnote.reference
*10 Even assuming that Richmond's assertions concerning both entities are correct, namely that the “Supreme Court of Wampanoag Tribe of Greyhead Wolf Band??? and the “Pembina Nation Little Shell California Federal Tribal Circuit Court??? are legitimate Indian tribal courts, it would nevertheless prove to be futile to permit the proposed amendment of his petition because (1) the named respondents have no affirmative non-discretionary ministerial legal duty to enforce the judgments and orders of Indian tribal courts; (2) relief in the nature of mandamus cannot issue from a federal district court compelling the named respondents to enforce tribal court orders as such; and (3) this court has neither the power nor the justification on this record to enter any order purporting to vacate orders or judgments entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of California or the state courts of California and Utah, in aid of the purported exercise of jurisdiction by the “Supreme Court of Wampanoag Tribe of Greyhead Wolf Band??? or the “Pembina Nation Little Shell California Federal Tribal Circuit Court.
None of the extraordinary relief that Richmond seeks in this case could be granted to him under any conceivable set of facts he could prove in support of his proposed amended petition. Under these circumstances, granting leave to file Richmond's proposed amended petition would prove to be futile at best....
[More material on fed recognition deleted.]
Richmond makes frequent reference to the Oath of Office of the named respondents as well as state and federal judges as a source of a legal duty to enforce the orders at issue. Indeed, “[t]he Amended Mandamus is Directed Specifically to the Defendant Law Enforcement Officers by name who have refused to Obey their Oath of Office....
(Mot. To Amend at 3.) According to Richmond, the named respondents “were repeatedly asked to Obey their Oath of Office to Support and Defend the U.S. Constitution, but they have Stubbornly Refused to Obey Their Oath of Office that includes Obeying Judge Henry Lee Norman Anderson's Writ of Mandamus,??? (id.), purportedly issued by the “Pembina Nation Little Shell California Federal Tribal Circuit Court.
....13 At this point, Richmond has cited no provision of the United States Constitution, or any Act of Congress, ratified treaty of the United States, Executive Order, federal regulation or other law of the United States that may fairly be read to impose any such obligation on any federal officer or agency. Nor has he pointed to any reported opinion of the United States Supreme Court, the United States Courts of Appeals, or United States District Courts recognizing any such duty on the part of the named respondents or any other federal officer.footnote.reference....
[More material on fed law.]
Richmond argues that “[t]his Court is required to Obey Article VI Supremacy Clause that is the Supreme Law of the Land that includes Treaties,??? footnote.reference but Richmond cites to no treaty between the United States and the purported Wampanoag or Pembina bands, including the 1863 Treaty with the Chippewas, that imposes “a plainly defined and peremptory duty on the part of respondent to do the action in question,??? viz., enforce tribal court orders as against the state and federal courts in California and Utah.footnote.reference Nor does he cite to any Act of Congress creating any such obligation on the part of the named respondents, or any federal officer.footnote.reference
None of the judicial opinions cited by Richmond or by the documents he submits support his sweeping assertion that the named respondents must enforce the purported tribal court orders upon which he relies, or that this court “has No Authority or Discretion but to Confirm and Obey Judge Henry Lee Norman Anderson's Writ of Mandamus.
footnote.reference
Richmond misapprehends the legal principles governing the recognition and enforcement of judgments and orders in different state and federal courts....
[More fed law.]
In his original and proposed amended petitions, Richmond does not invoke any procedure for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments or orders in the federal courts. To the contrary, he insists that the “Pembina??? court “writ of mandamus??? served to validate the “Wampanoag??? court orders, and thereafter the named respondents and state and federal courts are duty-bound by their oaths of office to see to the enforcement of those orders.
Framed in those terms, Richmond's proposed amended petition must fail because of its legal insufficiency.
This Court May Not Vacate Orders or Judgments Entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of California or the State Courts of California and Utah on the Grounds Asserted by Richmond
Richmond's proposed amended petition demands that this court compel the named respondents to obtain the dismissal of judicial proceedings alleged to be pending before the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the California Superior Court, and Third District Court of the State of Utah, based upon the purported “Wamapanoag??? tribal court orders upon which he relies, and that this court grant relief vacating any orders entered by those courts after the “Wampanoag??? orders were issued. The underlying premise of Richmond's claim is that those courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate Richmond's interests because of his status as a “Sovereign Citizen??? and as an “adopted??? member of the purported “Wampanoag Tribe of Grayhead Wolf Band.
In asserting that “[a]s an International Sovereign Citizen, Plaintiff Curtis Richmond has Diplomatic Immunity,??? footnote.reference Richmond confuses the jurisdictional implications of Indian tribal membership with the legal immunity afforded diplomatic and consular officials of foreign nations.footnote.reference Contrary to Richmond's assertion, Indian tribes and their members are not covered by the provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq. (2000). Cf. Bank of Oklahoma v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 972 F.2d 1166, 1169 (10th Cir.1992) (noting that “the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that Indian tribes are not foreign sovereigns, but are ‘domestic dependent nations.’ Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 25, 31, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831)
).footnote.reference
*17 Even assuming that Richmond is a bona fide “adopted??? member of a bona fide Indian tribe,footnote.reference the tribe's civil authority does not follow him wherever he goes, cloaking him in a mantle of civil immunity, excusing him from the commonplace civil obligations to pay non-discriminatory taxes, register his vehicles, perform his contracts, repay his debts or obey federal, state and local laws.....
[More fed law]
Other than his expansive assertions of personal sovereignty and diplomatic immunity, Richmond has not articulated any legal basis for a conclusion that the United States District Court for the Southern District of California lacked subject-matter or personal jurisdiction over him in the litigation before that court.footnote.reference From Richmond's submissions, it appears that the court in that case awarded declaratory and injunctive relief against Richmond in December of 2005.footnote.reference....
[More]
If there is a genuine question concerning subject-matter jurisdiction over Richmond in the Southern District of California, he may raise that question before that court at any time. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.
). There is nothing requiring Richmond to raise that question in this forum, and no basis in federal law for a purported tribal court to interfere with that federal district court's jurisdictional determinations. If Richmond was dissatisfied with the rulings of the federal district court in California, he had the opportunity to appeal.
Nor is this court in a position to grant the relief Richmond seeks concerning state court proceedings in California or Utah to which he is a party....
[More]
Richmond does not point to any Act of Congress authorizing this court to grant injunctive relief vacating orders entered in, or compelling the dismissal of, the state court actions pending against him. Nor would relief in the nature of mandamus requiring compliance with Richmond's purported tribal court orders requiring such dismissal be granted “in aid of??? this court's jurisdiction, or “to protect or effectuate??? this court's judgments, as the Anti-Injunction Act would require....
[More]
Richmond could have raised any valid legal objections he may have to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the California or Utah courts before those forums at any time (see Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2); 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure: Pleading § 922, at 380 (4th ed. 1997) (“Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not waived by failure to demur, but can be attacked by motion or suggestion at any time during trial or on appeal ....
) footnote.reference), and could appeal to the appropriate state court of appeals any ruling that he believed to be erroneous.
Neither Richmond's original petition nor his proposed amended petition plead specific facts showing that his remedies at law in the California and Utah courts are inadequate or have been exhausted. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution guarantee Richmond the Process which is Due, namely, “ ‘the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,???
’ consistent with the requirements of fundamental fairness.
[More]
Simply labeling one's self as a “Sovereign Citizen??? does not immunize a person from the jurisdiction or processes of the state or federal courts. Adopting the label of “federal tribal circuit court??? or even “supreme court??? by itself does not imbue someone with the constitutional authority to bind the Attorney General of the United States or the United States Marshal to the enforcement of orders issued in that name....
[More, followed by a lecture to this militia]
It would be cynical indeed for a private civil litigant to treat tribal sovereignty as “nothing more than an inconsistent, paradoxical legal shell that American case law has constructed,??? footnote.reference or to attempt to invoke “tribal sovereignty??? as nothing more than a clever scam or an artful dodge footnote.reference-which clearly it is not.
SUMMARY
Granting leave for Richmond to file his proposed amended petition would prove to be futile-that is, it “would merely set the stage for the dismissal of the amended [petition],??? AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Management Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d at 578, because (1) the named respondents owe no nondiscretionary, plainly defined, peremptory and affirmative legal duty to enforce the lawful orders or judgments of an Indian tribal court; (2) relief in the nature of mandamus is a drastic remedy, available only in extraordinary circumstances, Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34-35, 101 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980), and absent such a plainly defined nondiscretionary duty, it is not available to compel federal officers to enforce Indian tribal court orders as such; and (3) Richmond's proposed amended pleading asserts no legal basis warranting the grant by this court of extraordinary equitable relief vacating orders entered in, or mandating the dismissal of, civil actions filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the California Superior Court and the Third District Court, State of Utah, to which Richmond is a party.
If Richmond has genuine objections to the jurisdiction of those courts in those cases, he may raise his objections before those courts, and if dissatisfied with the outcome, he may file an appeal to the appropriate court of appeals. He cites to no controlling case authority-Supreme Court or otherwise-even hinting that he may resort to one or another “tribal court??? to wrest jurisdiction over those cases away from the state and federal courts that have adjudicated them, or that he may enlist the Judicial Power of the United States, vested in this court by Article III of the Constitution, to aid him in that effort.
*22 For these reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff's “Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Writ of Mandamus to Conform with Subject Matter Jurisdiction Issues Covered in Court Order to Dismiss Without Prejudice??? (dkt. no. 11), is DENIED.
FN1. (“Order, Case No.2005-301-EFS,??? dated April 8, 2005, a copy of which is annexed to “Writ of Mandamus Confirming Pembina Nation Little Shell Calif. Federal Tribal Circuit Court Ordered Writ of Mandamus so Law Enforcement Must Obey Lawful Tribal Court Orders Supported by U.S. Supreme Court Rulings,??? filed January 5, 2006 (dkt. no. 1).)
[More]
....FN10. The partial compilation attached to Richmond's “Supplement to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Writ of Mandamus to Conform with Subject Matter Jurisdiction,??? filed April 7, 2006 (dkt. no. 13), appears to have been copied from a Native American Web site. See “Old Crossing treaty with the Red Lake and Pembina Bands of Chippewa,??? at http://
www.maquah.net/Historical/1863/1863-1864treaty-INDEX.html.
FN11. See
http://www.pembinanation1863.com/. This group appears to be governed by a “Grand Council??? comprised of members of the family of Ronald Delorme, “hereditary chief of the Little Shell Band of Indians of North Dakota.
354 F.3d at 811.
FN12. According to Richmond's exhibit, “The Grand Council of 1863, the governing group for the Pembina Nation Little Shell Band, live primarily in so-called north central North Dakota.
(“Welcome to the Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America,??? at http://
www.pembinanation1863.com/default.asp, a copy of which is annexed to “Plaintiff's Supplement to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Writ of Mandamus to Conform with Subject Matter Jurisdiction,??? filed April 7, 2006 (dkt. no. 13) (“Pet.Supp.
).)
FN13. (Addendum at 6.)
FN14. (Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed April 3, 2006 (dkt. no. 130), in James W. Burbank v. United States District Court, et al., Civil No. 2:04-CV-742 JEC (D.Utah), at 3.) Judge Conway noted that “[t]his organization is not to be confused with the Wampanoag Nation, Tribe of Gayhead, Wolf Band, a federally recognized Indian Tribe on Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts, though the similarity in name is undoubtedly no coincidence.
(Id. at 5 n. 1.) See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 70 Fed.Reg. 71193, 71197 (November 25, 2005) (listing “Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) of Massachusetts???).
FN15. See Anti-Defamation League, Law Enforcement Agency Resource Network, Extremism in America: Little Shell Pembina Band, at http://
www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Little_Shell.asp?.
Richmond's Addendum asserts that he “is a Sovereign Civilian,??? that “this Court MUST recognize the Sovereign Rights of Curtis Richmond,??? and that “[a]s an International Sovereign Citizen, Plaintiff Curtis Richmond has Diplomatic Immunity.
(Addendum at 1, 2, 3.) The Addendum proffers copies of several documents, including an “Act of State Reaffirmation of Dual Citizenship and Renunciation of Attempted Expatriation,??? a written notice asserting that “[a]ll people within this Dwelling, or Automobile, are SOVEREIGN PEOPLE with DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY UNDER THE ‘FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ACT’, Title 28, USC Sec. 1602 te seq.,??? and a “Citizen's Treatise,??? discussing the deeper meanings of capitalization, abbreviation, acronyms and the subtleties of the Government Printing Office Style Manual. (Id. (emphasis in original).)
[More]
....FN25. Richmond's Supplement also cites to the 1975 “Helsinki Accords??? (officially entitled Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act ), 73 Dept. of State Bull. 323 (1975), but the Helsinki Accords are
phrased in generalities, and there is no indication that the nations signing the agreement anticipated that it would be enforced by private litigants. Indeed, the Accords reaffirm respect for the sovereignty of its signers, id. at 324, and pledge noninterference in the internal affairs of those nations, id. at 325. Rather, the Accords create obligations on the signatory countries and establish goals which the nations will try to reach on their own.
Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir.1985) (per curiam). As then-President Ford stated before signing the Accords in 1975:
I would emphasize that the document I will sign is neither a treaty nor is it legally binding on any particular state. The Helsinki documents involve political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tension and opening further the lines of communication between the peoples of East and West.
United States v. Kakwirakeron, 730 F.Supp. 1200, 1201 (N.D.N.Y.1990) (quoting 73 Dept. of State Bull. 204, 205 (1975) (emphasis supplied by court)). “Thus, ‘
ndividuals aggrieved by the failure of nations to implement the Helsinki Accords will have to be content with the principle that violations of international agreements “are normally to be redressed outside the courtroom. ’ Frolova, 761 F.2d at 376 (quoting Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1092 (D.C.Cir.1980)).'' Id. at 1202.
Richmond also points to the 1961 Hague Convention abolishing the Requirement of Legalization for Foreign Public Documents, the text of which may be found in T.I.A.S. 10072; 33 U.S. Treaty Series (UST) 883; 527 U.N. Treaty Series (UNTS) 189, in the “International Law Digests??? volume of the Martindale-Hubbel Law Directory, and on the Internet, see http:// www.hcch.net/index en.php?act=conventions.text & cid=41. The Convention provides for the simplified certification of public (including notarized) documents to be used in countries that have joined the convention, and has no bearing upon the enforcement of Indian tribal court orders within the United States. See U.S. Dept. of State, Office of Authentications, “Apostille Requirements,??? at http://www.state.gov/m/a/auth/c16921.htm.
FN26. Richmond cites to 28 U.S.C. § 2072, which simply confirms that “[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts ... and courts of appeals,??? and says nothing about Indian tribes, tribal courts, or tribal court orders....
[More]
FN32. Nothing in the language of the Act of July 27, 1868, “concerning the Rights of American Citizens in foreign States,??? ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223, lends any support to Richmond's assertions in this proceeding.
FN33. “Adoption??? into tribal membership, even by the governing body of a federally recognized Indian tribe, does not necessarily confer legal status as an “Indian??? on the adoptee for all purposes, particularly where none of the individual's ancestors lived in what is now the United States before its discovery by Europeans....
[More]
FN40. Cf. “Magical Thinking,??? at http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magicalthinking (“Another form of magical thinking occurs when people believe that words can directly affect the world. This can mean avoiding talking about certain subjects (‘speak of the devil and he'll appear’), using euphemisms instead of certain words, or believing that to know the ‘true name’ of something gives one power over it, or that certain chants, prayers or mystical phrases will change things.); see generally James George Frazer, Robert Fraser, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion (Oxford abr. ed.1998).
FN41. Magical thinking “often mistakes correlation for causation. Id....
[More][/s]
